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Abstract 
 
While convertible offerings announced between 1984 and 1999 induce 
average abnormal stock returns of -1.69%, convertible announcement effects over the 
period 2000 to 2008 are more than twice as negative (-4.59%). We hypothesize that 
this evolution is attributable to a shift in the convertible bond investor base from long-
only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds. These funds buy convertibles and 
short the underlying stocks, causing downward price pressure. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, we find that the differences in announcement returns between the 
Traditional Investor period (1984-1999) and the Arbitrage period (2000-September 
2008) disappear when controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling associated with a 
range of hedging strategies. Post-issuance stock returns are also in line with the 
arbitrage explanation. Average announcement effects of convertibles issued during 
the Global Financial Crisis are even more negative (-9.12%), due to a combination of 
short-selling price pressure and issuer, issue, and macroeconomic characteristics 
associated with these offerings.  
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1. Introduction 
Convertible bonds are hybrid securities that combine features of straight debt and equity. They 
resemble straight debt by paying a fixed coupon rate, and they resemble common equity by 
offering the possibility of conversion into stock as an alternative for receiving the nominal value 
in cash at the redemption date. Convertibles are a popular source of financing. Over the past 30 
years, convertible debt issuance comprised approximately ten percent of total securities issuance 
by U.S. corporations.1 
This paper is inspired by the observation that stock returns around convertible bond 
announcements have sharply declined over the past decade, whereas there is no corresponding 
decline in seasoned equity or straight debt announcement returns. While convertible offerings 
announced between 1984 and 1999 induce average abnormal stock returns of -1.69%, 
convertibles announced in the period 2000 to 2008 are associated with average abnormal stock 
price declines that are more than twice as large (-4.59%).  
We hypothesize that the sharp decline in observed convertible bond announcement effects is 
attributable to a substantial change in the buy-side of the convertible bond market. Convertibles 
traditionally appealed to long-only investors looking for diversification benefits and indirect 
participation in equity (Lummer and Riepe, 1993). However, Choi et al. (2009) show a dramatic 
increase in the importance of convertible arbitrage funds since the end of the 1990s. To exploit 
underpriced convertible issues, convertible arbitrageurs buy convertible debt and short the 
underlying common stock. If demand curves for stock are downward-sloping, the supply 
increase associated with this arbitrage-related short selling should result in a negative stock price 
effect around the convertible bond issue date. Most recent convertibles are placed very quickly, 
                                                 
1
 That is ten percent of the total amount of convertible debt, seasoned equity, and straight debt issued by U.S. firms 
(excluding financials and utilities). Source: Securities Data Company New Issues database. 
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resulting in a very short time span (one trading day or less) between announcement and issuance. 
Our key prediction is therefore that the observed highly negative “announcement” effects of 
recent convertible bond issues may partly reflect temporary price pressure associated with 
arbitrage-induced short selling upon convertible bond issuance.  
To test this prediction, we collect a sample of 1,436 convertible bonds issued by U.S. 
corporations from the Securities Data Company’s New Issues database (henceforth SDC). In line 
with previous studies (Choi et al., 2009; De Jong et al., 2011), we construct a measure for the 
amount of hedging-induced short selling associated with each convertible bond offering by 
regressing changes in monthly short interest around convertible bond issues on a number of 
potential issuer-specific, issue-specific, and time-varying determinants of arbitrageurs’ interest in 
a given offering. The predicted value of this regression reflects the portion of the change in 
monthly short interest that can be attributed to short selling by convertible arbitrageurs, as 
opposed to short selling by fundamental traders.  
In line with our hypothesis, we find that the difference in announcement-period stock returns 
between convertibles issued in the period 1984 to 1999 (labeled “Traditional Investor period”) 
and convertibles issued in the period 2000 to September 2008 (labeled “Arbitrage period”) is no 
longer significant after controlling for our constructed measure for arbitrage-induced short 
selling. Our findings are robust to assuming different convertible arbitrage strategies (delta-
neutral, bullish gamma, and bearish gamma hedging). Our analysis controls for a wide range of 
issuer-specific, issue-specific, and macroeconomic determinants of convertible bond 
announcement effects. 
The Global Financial Crisis sparked a sharp contraction in the convertible arbitrage hedge 
fund industry. Masters (2009) writes: “Now hedge funds play a much smaller role in the investor 
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base, representing less than half of the buyers of new issues (of convertible bonds) in many 
cases.” To the extent that this shift in the investor base results in less short selling, we expect to 
observe less negative abnormal announcement returns for convertibles issued during the Crisis. 
However, our event study results indicate that average stock returns around the announcements 
of convertible bonds issued between the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 and 
December 2009 are almost twice as negative as in the Arbitrage period (-9.12%). Our evidence 
suggests that the highly negative announcement effects of Post-Lehman convertibles can be 
attributed to short-selling price pressure from the remaining convertible arbitrage funds in the 
market, as well as to offering and market characteristics that negatively affect announcement 
returns (high issuer and market volatility, and severe offering underpricing).  
To further strengthen our case for the arbitrage explanation for the evolution in convertible 
bond announcement effects, we also analyze post-issuance abnormal stock returns. Since 
arbitrage-induced short selling does not result from fundamental news about the stock, we expect 
a reversal of the negative stock price impact of arbitrage-related short selling once the market has 
absorbed the additional supply of shares. Consistent with this prediction, we find significant 
positive abnormal stock returns following Arbitrage-period convertible bond issues, with the 
magnitude of the reversal significantly influenced by our constructed measure for the arbitrage 
demand associated with these offerings. In contrast, we find no evidence of such reversal for 
issues made during periods with lower arbitrage fund involvement in convertible bond issues.  
Our analysis contributes to the following three stands of literature. First, we complement 
event studies on stock returns around convertible debt announcements. A common finding of 
these studies is that convertibles induce negative abnormal stock returns intermediate in size 
between the announcement effects associated with seasoned equity and straight debt offerings 
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(Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Lewis et al., 1999). This pattern is 
consistent with the signaling model of Myers and Majluf (1984), which predicts that relatively 
more equity-like security offerings are more likely to be perceived as a signal of firm 
overvaluation. Our study sheds new light on these stylized facts by documenting that 
announcement-period stock returns associated with post-2000 convertible offerings are far more 
negative than those for equity offerings made over the same period. However, we also show that 
part of the highly negative “announcement” return associated with recent convertible bond 
offerings is actually caused by short-lived stock price pressure induced by short-selling activities 
of convertible bond buyers. Our results imply that event studies using recent convertible bond 
offering announcements should correct for the influence of buy-side short selling associated with 
announced convertible bond issues. If not, they are likely to draw overly pessimistic conclusions 
on the true magnitude of the transactions’ impact on firm value. 
Second, our study contributes to a recent stream of corporate finance articles that explicitly 
take the influence of investor characteristics into account. As pointed out by Baker (2009), 
corporate finance studies have traditionally focused on the corporate supply side, thereby 
implicitly considering the investor side as a black box with perfectly elastic and competitive 
demand. However, a number of studies find that corporate finance actions can also be influenced 
through investor demand channels (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary, 2009; Lemmon 
and Roberts, 2010). Within this stream of literature, a limited number of papers document the 
impact of the actions of convertible arbitrageurs on convertible issuance volumes (Choi et al., 
2010; De Jong et al., 2010) and convertible bond design (Brown et al., 2010; De Jong et al., 
2011). Our study complements these papers by examining the impact of buy-side shifts on the 
stock returns around convertible bond announcements.  
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Third, our paper complements a number of studies on the performance of convertible 
arbitrage strategies (Fabozzi et al., 2009; Agarwal et al., 2010; Hutchinson and Gallagher, 2010). 
While these articles focus on portfolio returns realized by convertible arbitrage funds over the 
years following issuance, our key goal is to analyze to what extent the short-selling transactions 
of convertible arbitrageurs affect issuer stock returns around convertible bond issuance. We find 
that post-issuance changes in required short-selling positions are very small and therefore 
unlikely to provoke strong issuer stock price reactions beyond the issue date, even with daily 
rebalancing of arbitrage portfolios.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical 
background for our study. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1. Shifts in the convertible bond investor base 
Theoretical studies on convertible debt predict that convertibles are able to mitigate costs 
associated with attracting common equity or straight debt financing (Green, 1984; Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1988; Stein, 1992). Consistent with the hybrid debt-equity nature of convertible debt, 
event studies on the stock returns around convertible debt announcements commonly find that 
these returns are negative and intermediate in size between the announcement effects associated 
with seasoned equity and straight debt offerings.2 The majority of these studies focus on a period 
in which convertible bond investors (such as mutual funds specialized in convertible bond 
investments) buy the convertibles without shorting the underlying stock. However, around the 
year 2000 the convertible bond investor base shifted from traditional long-only buyers towards 
                                                 
2
 See Eckbo et al. (2007) for an overview of event studies on security offering announcement returns. 
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convertible arbitrageurs (mostly hedge funds, but also institutional investors). By the beginning 
of the 21st century, hedge funds were purchasing up to 80% of new convertible issues (Brown et 
al., 2010). The recent Global Financial Crisis, in turn, marked a substantial decline in the 
importance of convertible arbitrageurs driven by negative performance, heavy redemptions, and 
severe reductions in inflows (Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index research report, 2009; 
Hutchinson and Gallagher, 2010; Steinbrugge, 2011).  
The main goal of this paper is to examine the impact of these two important shifts in the 
involvement of convertible arbitrage funds on issuer stock returns around convertible bond 
offerings. We distinguish three periods, each with a different involvement of convertible 
arbitrageurs. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when convertible arbitrageurs became 
dominant players in the convertible bond market, because hedge funds do not disclose much 
information on their investments. To obtain more insight into the evolution of convertible 
arbitrage funds over time, we search the Factiva database for news sources that mention 
“convertible arbitrage” or related terms over the period 1984 to 2009.3 Figure 1 provides the 
results of this search. The graph shows a sharp rise in the number of hits from 2000 onwards. 
This result is in line with Choi et al. (2009), who document a dramatic increase in the total assets 
under management of convertible bond hedge funds at the end of the 1990s.4 We therefore use 
January 2000 as a cutoff date for the start of the Arbitrage period, in which the convertible bond 
investor base is dominated by convertible arbitrageurs, and label the previous window (from 
1984 to December 1999) the Traditional Investor period.  
                                                 
3
 Factiva provides access to thousands of archived newspaper and magazine articles, as well as to press releases 
appearing on newswires.  
4
 A Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Index research report dated May 2009 confirms that January 2000 is a reasonable 
cutoff date for the start of the Arbitrage period: “Up until the year 2000, the convertible bond market was primarily 
driven by long-only buyers. Hedge funds entered the space in increasing numbers thereafter (…). The hedge fund 
influx represented a change in the buyer base.” 
                                                                       7 
 
As argued by Beber and Pagano (2012), the Lehman Brothers collapse on September 15, 
2008 is one of the most salient turning points in the course of events leading to the crisis. We 
therefore consider this date as the start of the third period, labeled the “Post-Lehman” period.  
 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
 
2.2. Testable predictions  
Unlike traditional long-only investors, convertible arbitrageurs generally short a portion of 
the convertible debt issuer’s stock to make their position invariant to small stock price 
movements. Their profits result from the fact that convertibles tend to be underpriced at issuance, 
and from their ability to exploit superior technology in managing convertible risk. Potential 
reasons for convertible debt underpricing include illiquidity, small issue size, and complexities 
associated with the valuation of hybrid securities (Lhabitant, 2002). 
If demand curves for stock are not perfectly elastic, the increase in the supply of shares 
resulting from arbitrage-related short selling should induce downward stock price pressure 
around the convertible bond issue date. A number of studies effectively find evidence of negative 
abnormal stock returns around convertible bond issue dates (Arshanapalli et al., 2005; Loncarski 
et al., 2009; De Jong et al., 2011).  
Arguably, arbitrageurs should establish their short positions on convertible bond issue dates 
rather than on announcement dates. However, almost all recent convertible bond offerings take 
place within one trading day of the announcement date. The most important reason for this rapid 
placement is that most recent convertibles are structured as Rule 144A offerings. Such offerings 
can be sold to selected institutional investors without having to incur time-consuming activities 
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such as road shows and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. As a result of the 
overlap between issuance and announcement dates, the observed “announcement” effect of 
convertible bond issues may reflect price pressure associated with the shorting activities of 
convertible arbitrageurs. Given the different levels of involvement of this investor class over the 
three periods considered in our study, we obtain the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Arbitrage-period convertibles induce more negative announcement-period stock 
returns than Traditional Investor- and Post-Lehman-period convertibles. 
 
Stock market reactions to convertible bond announcements may be influenced by issuer 
characteristics, issue characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions (Lewis et al., 1999, 2003; 
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2007; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008; Loncarski et al., 2008). 
Any observed difference in the stockholder wealth effects of convertible bond offerings across 
the three periods may thus be caused by intertemporal changes in these determinants. We 
establish whether the differences in convertible debt announcement returns across the three 
periods are effectively caused by shifts in buy-side characteristics by testing the following 
prediction: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Differences in announcement-period stock returns between Arbitrage-, Traditional 
Investor-, and Post-Lehman-period convertibles disappear when controlling for arbitrage-
related short selling associated with the convertible debt offering.  
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If demand curves are only inelastic in the short run, stock prices should revert to their 
fundamental values once the market has absorbed the supply shock caused by arbitrage-related 
short selling. Given that convertibles issued in the Arbitrage period are likely to provoke more 
arbitrage-induced price pressure, we expect to observe stronger positive stock price reversals for 
these issues compared with offerings made during the Traditional Investor or Post-Lehman 
periods. We thus obtain the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Arbitrage-period convertible offerings are followed by a stronger positive stock 
price reversal than Traditional Investor- and Post-Lehman-period convertibles. 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Convertible bond, seasoned equity, and straight debt samples 
We obtain data for U.S. convertible debt, seasoned equity, and straight debt offerings made 
between January 1984 and December 2009 from the SDC database. We exclude utilities (SIC 
codes 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), and consolidate multiple tranches 
of convertibles and straight debt offerings issued by the same firm on the same date. In the 
convertible debt sample, we only include plain vanilla convertible bonds (no exchangeable 
bonds, mandatory convertible bonds, or convertible preferred stock). In the equity sample, we 
only include seasoned common stock offerings made by the firm itself (no IPOs, no offerings 
made by existing shareholders, no preferred stock issues, no unit issues). We eliminate asset- and 
mortgage-backed bonds, depository notes, and bonds issued with warrants from the straight debt 
sample. We thus obtain a data set of 1,436 convertible debt issues, 4,885 seasoned equity issues, 
and 8,734 straight debt issues. The Traditional Investor period accounts for 727 issues, the 
Arbitrage period for 645 issues, and the Post-Lehman period for 64 issues. 
We obtain balance sheet and income statement variables from the Compustat Fundamentals 
Annual database, stock price-related data (i.e., prices, shares outstanding, and trading volumes) 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), issue-specific information from SDC, 
and macroeconomic data from Datastream.  
 
3.2. Measure for arbitrage-related short selling 
To test the arbitrage explanation for differences in convertible debt announcement returns 
across the three periods, we construct a measure for the amount of arbitrage-related short selling 
associated with each convertible bond offering. In a first step, we download monthly short 
interest data from the Securities Monthly file of the CRSP-Compustat merged database. These 
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data are available from March 2003 until June 2008. To match short interest data to convertible 
bond issues, we apply the algorithm used by Bechmann (2004) and Choi et al. (2009). If a bond 
is issued before the cutoff trade date of a given month (three trading days prior to the 15th of each 
month), we match the issue date with the short interest data filed for that month. Otherwise, we 
match the issue date with the short interest data for the following month. As short interest is 
reported bi-monthly since September 2007, we adjust the algorithm to a two-monthly frequency 
from that month onwards. We scale the change in monthly short interest (∆SI) by the number of 
shares outstanding (SO) measured on trading day -20 relative to the announcement date. We find 
an average (median) value of 0.019 (0.014) for the ∆SI/SO ratio, which is similar to values 
recorded by Choi et al. (2009) and De Jong et al. (2011).  
As argued by Choi et al. (2009), part of the observed increase in short interest around 
convertible bond offerings may be attributable to the short-selling actions of fundamental traders. 
In a second step, we therefore isolate the portion of the ∆SI/SO measure that can effectively be 
attributed to short selling by convertible arbitrageurs by regressing ∆SI/SO on potential 
determinants of convertible arbitrageurs’ interest in that particular convertible offering. We take 
the predicted value of this regression for each convertible bond issue as a measure for the change 
in short interest caused by arbitrage-related short selling for that convertible bond.5  
We expect convertible arbitrageurs to be more interested in issuers with more liquid shares 
(since high liquidity makes it easier for them to obtain their hedging positions), with no dividend 
payouts (since dividends represent a cash outflow for short sellers), with higher institutional 
ownership (since institutional investors are more likely to lend out their shares than individual 
investors), and with more volatile stock returns (since volatility positively affects the option 
                                                 
5
 Mitchell et al. (2004) apply a similar procedure to isolate the portion of changes in short interest attributable to the 
hedging behavior of merger arbitrageurs.  
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value of the convertible, thus allowing a higher potential profit). We therefore consider the 
Amihud (2002) measure for illiquidity, a dummy variable equal to one for convertible debt 
issuers that paid out a dividend in the previous fiscal year, the percentage of institutional 
ownership (obtained from Thomson Reuters), and the issuer’s stock return volatility as potential 
issuer-specific determinants of the arbitrage demand for convertible debt offerings. Appendix A 
contains detailed definitions of all explanatory variables included in this paper.  
In addition, we expect arbitrageurs’ interest in a convertible bond issue to be affected by the 
characteristics of the offering itself. We predict a larger increase in arbitrage-related short 
interest around offerings for which arbitrageurs need to short-sell a larger number of shares to 
hedge their positions. We therefore include the ratio of DeltaNeutral to shares outstanding (SO), 
with DeltaNeutral representing the expected number of shares shorted by arbitrageurs following 
a delta-neutral hedging strategy. Appendix B provides a detailed definition of this variable. 
Although delta-neutral hedging represents the “bread-and-butter” strategy of convertible 
arbitrageurs (Calamos, 2003), arbitrage funds may also follow directional hedging strategies in 
which they short sell slightly more or less than what would be required under a delta-neutral 
hedge (Calamos, 2003; Fabozzi et al., 2009).6 Consistent with Fabozzi et al. (2009), we define 
GammaBear (GammaBull) as the number of shares expected to be shorted under a bearish 
(bullish) gamma hedging strategy in which arbitrageurs short sell delta plus (minus) 0.09 at 
issuance. The bearish gamma hedge yields a small profit when stock prices decrease, and the 
bullish gamma hedge yields a small profit when stock prices increase. Appendix B provides 
detailed definitions for these variables. We also expect arbitrageurs’ interest to be positively 
                                                 
6
 Fabozzi et al. (2009) also consider a range of other strategies followed by arbitrage funds. For example, funds can 
engage in convergence hedge strategies in which they exploit pricing differentials between options and convertibles 
with the same underlying stock, or between different convertible bonds. For the purpose of our analysis, only 
hedging strategies involving short selling of the issuer’s stock are relevant.  
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influenced by the convertible debt gamma, calculated as outlined in Appendix B. Gamma 
captures the sensitivity of the convertible’s delta with respect to changes in the underlying stock 
price. A convertible with a high gamma offers dynamic hedging opportunities more frequently, 
thus allowing the possibility of higher returns (Calamos, 2003). Finally, we expect arbitrageurs 
to be more interested in zero-coupon convertibles. The reason is that paying no coupons makes it 
easier to separate the option component of the convertible from its fixed-income component, 
which is a technique often applied by convertible arbitrage hedge funds.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these potential issuer- and issue-
specific hedging demand determinants for the three periods.  
 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
Kruskal-Wallis p-values indicate the joint significance level of the differences in each 
variable across the three periods. In the final column, we report the results of t-tests for pairwise 
differences in the means across two periods. The letters a (b) indicate significant differences (at 
the 5% significance level or lower) in the mean value between the Traditional Investor and the 
Arbitrage (Post-Lehman) periods, and the letter c indicates a significant difference (at the 5% 
significance level or lower) in the mean value between the Arbitrage and the Post-Lehman 
periods.  
We find evidence of significant differences in arbitrage demand determinants across the 
three periods. Most remarkably, the percentage of institutional ownership of convertible debt 
issuers increases substantially between the Traditional Investor and the Arbitrage periods (from 
41% to 72%), and stock return volatility is almost twice as large for Post-Lehman issuers than 
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for other issuers. Convertible bond gammas increase significantly over the sample period, from 
an average of 0.005 in the Traditional Investor period to an average of 0.014 in the Post-Lehman 
period.7 While approximately 7% of the convertibles issued during the first two periods have a 
zero-coupon structure, we find no zero-coupon offerings in the Post-Lehman period.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the results of a regression analysis of ∆SI/SO on the potential 
determinants of arbitrage-related short selling. The analysis includes convertibles issued between 
2003 and 2008 for which all necessary explanatory variables are available. In all regressions 
reported throughout the paper, we calculate t-statistics using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. 
Next to including issuer- and issue-specific features, the reported regressions also control for 
temporal variations in the capital supply from convertible arbitrageurs. As a first proxy for 
fluctuations in the importance of convertible arbitrageurs as an investor class, we count the 
number of news sources in Factiva that mention “convertible arbitrage” or a related term over the 
three months prior to issuance (CAFactiva). One limitation of this measure is that it does not 
distinguish between positive and negative developments affecting the capital supply of 
convertible arbitrageurs (i.e., it abstracts from the specific content of the news sources). We 
therefore consider lagged capital flows into convertible arbitrage funds (CAFlows) over the 
quarter prior to issuance as an alternative proxy for temporal fluctuations in the importance of 
hedge funds as an investor class. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the calculation of 
this variable. The CAFlows variable may be a more accurate measure than CAFactiva, but 
presents the disadvantage that it can only be obtained from 1994 onwards. 
                                                 
7
 The gammas of the convertibles in our data set are low. This finding can be attributed to the fact that we measure 
gamma on the convertible debt issue date, when most convertibles are still relatively far out of the money. Gamma 
tends to be highest for at the money convertibles (Calamos, 2003).  
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The R2s of the regression specifications indicate that the arbitrage demand proxies are able 
to explain approximately 20% of the variation in short interest increases around convertible bond 
offerings. This result is consistent with the notion that part of the increase in short interest 
reflects trading patterns by fundamental traders rather than arbitrageurs.  
In Columns (1) and (2), we assume that the arbitrageurs follow a delta-neutral hedging 
strategy. Column (1) includes CAFactiva and Column (2) includes CAFlows, which is only 
available for 330 observations. In line with our predictions, we find a significant negative impact 
of the Amihud illiquidity measure (both columns), and a significant positive impact of the 
percentage of institutional ownership (Column (1)) and of the required amount of shares to be 
shorted, measured as DeltaNeutral/SO (both columns), on ∆SI/SO. None of the other variables 
has a significant impact. In Column (3), we replicate the analysis in Column (1) assuming that 
arbitrageurs adopt a bearish gamma hedging strategy. We find that GammaBear/SO has a highly 
significant positive impact with a coefficient size similar to that of DeltaNeutral/SO, with the 
other regression results remaining largely unaltered. As can be seen from Column (4), a similar 
conclusion holds when we assume that arbitrageurs follow a bullish gamma hedging strategy. 
Our results thus seem very robust to alternative hedging strategies. This conclusion is not 
surprising, as the gamma hedging strategies involve only mild deviations from delta-neutral 
hedging, resulting in very high pairwise correlations (over 0.90) between the DeltaNeutral, 
GammaBear and GammaBull measures.8  
In a final step, we use the coefficients of the regression in Column (1) of Table 1 to obtain 
an estimate of the arbitrage-related change in short interest for each convertible debt offering 
issued over the period 1984 to 2009. That is, for each observation for which we have all 
                                                 
8
 As argued by Calamos (2003), hedge fund consultants generally consider anything more than a very mild deviation 
from the delta required for delta-neutral hedging inappropriate for a convertible arbitrage portfolio. 
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explanatory variables available, we multiply the value of the regression coefficients by the values 
of the correspondent explanatory variables. The resulting value, labeled ArbDemand/SO, 
represents the estimated change in short interest relative to shares outstanding caused by 
convertible arbitrageurs’ short selling associated with that particular convertible bond.9  
 
3.3. Control variables 
Next to our hedging demand measure, we include a number of issuer-specific variables in 
our analysis of convertible bond announcement stock returns. Appendix A provides a detailed 
definition of each of the control variables. All issuer characteristics included in the regression 
analyses are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the convertible debt announcement date, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Since convertibles encompass an equity component, we expect stockholder reactions to 
convertible debt announcements to be more negative for issuers with high equity-related 
financing costs. Similarly, due to the debt component embedded in convertible debt, we also 
expect convertible debt announcement stock returns to be more negative for issuers with high 
costs of attracting new debt financing.10 In line with Lewis et al. (1999, 2003), we use the 
amount of slack capital and the pre-announcement stock runup as proxies for equity-related 
financing costs. When a firm with sufficient slack capital or a high stock runup issues equity, 
stockholders are more likely to infer that this firm is overvalued. We thus expect both the slack 
                                                 
9
 Findings remain similar when we use the coefficients in Column (2) for this purpose. The reason why we use 
Column (1) is that CAFactiva is available over the entire sample period, while CAFlows is only available from 1994 
onwards.  
10
 This prediction might seem at odds with the convertible debt rationale of Stein (1992), which states that 
convertibles can be used as tools to mitigate equity-related adverse selection costs. However, even though 
convertibles entail smaller equity-related financing costs than equity offerings, their equity component still induces 
an incremental increase in the level of equity-related costs of the issuing firm. Thus, within a convertible debt 
sample, we expect stockholder reactions to be more negative for issuers with high equity-related financing costs. An 
analogous reasoning applies for the impact of debt-related financing costs on convertible debt announcement 
returns.  
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capital and the pre-announcement stock runup to have a negative impact on stockholder reactions 
to convertible debt announcements. To capture debt-related financing costs, we include the ratio 
of taxes paid to total assets and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. In the finance literature, 
it is generally assumed that firms with a higher leverage ratio and a lower tax ratio face higher 
costs of attracting new debt financing (see, e.g., Lewis et al., 1999, 2003). Next to these specific 
equity- and debt-related costs measures, we also include four control variables that act as proxies 
for both equity- and debt-related financing costs. The volatility of the firm’s stock expressed 
relative to the volatility on the S&P 500 index measures the level of asymmetric information 
associated with the firm, as well as the firm’s riskiness. The market-to-book ratio may act as a 
proxy for growth opportunities (and as such be negatively associated with financing costs), but 
may also measure the potential for underinvestment and asymmetric information. As such, its 
predicted impact is unclear. Lastly, we include the ratio of fixed assets to total assets and the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Firms with a high proportion of fixed assets and/or a large size 
tend to have lower levels of asymmetric information relating to their value and risk, resulting in 
smaller equity- and debt-related financing costs (MacKie-Mason, 1990).  
We also control for a number of issue-specific characteristics. We include the credit rating 
of the offering (transformed into a numerical measure as outlined in Appendix A). Higher 
CreditRating values imply worse credit ratings, and therefore a higher credit risk associated with 
the offering. We also include the ratio of offering proceeds to total assets, since Krasker (1986) 
predicts that relatively larger equity(-linked) security offerings should result in more negative 
announcement stock returns. Following Myers and Majluf (1984), we expect relatively more 
equity-like convertibles to induce more negative stockholder wealth effects. To capture the 
convertible bond’s equity component size, we include the conversion premium and the 
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convertible bond maturity. Bonds with a larger (smaller) conversion premium (maturity) are 
assumed to be less equity-like. We obtain similar results when we replace the conversion 
premium and the maturity by the convertible debt delta, which acts as an umbrella measure of 
the convertible bond equity component size.11 We also include a 144A dummy variable to 
disentangle the effect of the Rule 144A private placement of convertibles from the effect of 
hedging-induced short selling, and an Issue=Announcement dummy variable equal to one for 
convertibles for which the issue date coincides with the announcement date or falls on the 
trading day after the announcement date. Convertibles for which this is the case are expected to 
be associated with more negative announcement returns, since their announcement-period stock 
returns are more likely to capture hedging-induced price pressure. We also control for 
convertible bond underpricing at issuance (calculated as outlined in Appendix C). Offerings with 
higher initial underpricing should be received less favorably by the market, since they imply a 
wealth transfer from existing stockholders to convertible bondholders.  
Finally, we include a number of standard macroeconomic variables suggested by the 
literature, i.e., interest rates, term spreads, market runups, and market return volatilities. In the 
regressions, all macroeconomic determinants are lagged one quarter. Following a similar 
reasoning as for the issuer-specific variables, we expect stock price reactions to convertible debt 
announcements to be negatively influenced by proxies for economy-wide financing costs. We 
thus predict a negative impact of interest rates, term spreads, and market return volatilities, since 
these variables act as proxies for the level of debt-related financing costs in the economy as a 
whole (Choe et al., 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008). In turn, 
we expect a positive impact of market returns, since financing costs are assumed to be lower 
                                                 
11
 Detailed results of all untabulated robustness checks mentioned in the paper are available on demand.  
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during market booms (Choe et al., 1993). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for these control 
variables, and compares their average values across the three periods.  
 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 
The univariate test results indicate that Arbitrage-period issuers have a significantly larger 
slack and market-to-book ratio, and significantly smaller tax payments, relative stock return 
volatility, fixed assets, and total assets, than Traditional Investor-period issuers. With the 
exception of the finding on stock return volatility, these results suggest that firms issuing 
convertibles during the Arbitrage period face higher external financing costs than pre-2000 
issuers. Post-Lehman issuers also differ from those in the other periods on several dimensions, 
but the results do not provide a clear picture on the relative magnitude of their financing costs. 
On the one hand Post-Lehman issuers tend to have lower tax levels and higher debt levels, 
suggesting higher debt-related financing costs; on the other hand they tend to have a larger firm 
size, suggesting lower costs of attracting external financing. They also have lower market-to-
book ratios than issuers in preceding periods.  
We also uncover significant differences in almost all issue-specific characteristics across the 
three windows. Convertible bond offerings have significantly better credit ratings towards the 
end of the research period, as reflected in smaller CreditRating values. Consistent with Fabozzi 
et al. (2009), we find an increase in conversion premia after the year 2000, but conversion 
premia decrease again during the Post-Lehman period. In line with Huang and Ramirez (2010), 
we find that the percentage of convertibles issued under Rule 144A increases dramatically as of 
the year 2000. While only 9% of the Traditional Investor-period issues are made under the Rule 
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144A regime, the percentage of Rule 144A issues increases to 85% in the Arbitrage period. In 
the Post-Lehman period this percentage drops back to approximately one-third of all offerings 
(34%). We also find a sharp increase in the percentage of offerings for which the announcement 
and issue date coincide, from the Arbitrage period onwards. This finding can be attributed to the 
rapid placement of recent convertibles, which is in turn caused by the increase in the importance 
of Rule 144A offerings and by the very fast buying decisions of convertible arbitrage funds 
(Dong et al., 2012). During the Traditional Investor period, underpricing is significantly higher 
than during the Arbitrage period. However, Arbitrage-period convertibles are still substantially 
underpriced, thus offering ample profit potential for convertible arbitrageurs. Post-Lehman 
offerings, in turn, are offered at discounts that are more than twice as large as underpricing levels 
during the Arbitrage period. One possible explanation for this finding is that, during the Global 
Financial Crisis, issuers that are unable to obtain standard financing sources use convertible 
bonds as a last-resort financing type. These high underpricing levels may be necessary to 
convince risk-averse investors to include the convertibles in their portfolios. 
Finally, most of the macroeconomic variables are also significantly different across the three 
periods. For example, we find that market volatility is significantly higher during the Post-
Lehman period than in preceding periods. Together, the descriptive results presented in Table 2 
highlight the need to control for firm-specific, issue-specific, and macroeconomic financing costs 
measures when analyzing the source of the differences in abnormal stock returns between the 
three periods.  
 
4. Impact of arbitrage short selling on convertible debt announcement returns 
4.1. Convertible debt, seasoned equity, and straight debt announcement returns 
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We measure abnormal stock returns by applying standard event study methodology as 
outlined in Brown and Warner (1985). We use the return over the CRSP equally-weighted 
market index as a proxy for the market return, and estimate the market model over the window (-
240, -40) relative to the announcement date. In line with most existing event studies, we measure 
cumulative announcement-period stock returns (CARs) over the window (-1, 1) relative to the 
security offering announcement date. We assume that the public announcement of convertible 
debt offerings happens on the filing date obtained from SDC.12 However, this date is only 
available for publicly-placed convertible bond issues. For the remainder of the convertibles (754 
in total), we manually look up the announcement date in Factiva. For seasoned equity offerings, 
we identify the announcement date as the filing date stated in SDC (available for virtually all of 
the offerings). For publicly-placed straight debt offerings, we also use the filing date. For straight 
debt issues for which the filing date is not available due to the fact that they are either structured 
as Rule 144A offerings or privately placed (60% of the sample), we use the issue date obtained 
from SDC. Our findings remain similar when we exclude the straight debt issues for which we 
have no filing date available from the analysis. Table 3 provides the results of the event study 
analysis for the three security types.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
During the Traditional Investor period, security offering announcement effects are similar in 
magnitude to those documented in prior studies (see, e.g., Eckbo et al., 2007). This is no surprise 
                                                 
12
 We manually cross-check the accuracy of the filing dates by verifying the actual announcement dates obtained 
from Factiva for 100 convertible bond issues. The results of this check indicate that SDC filing dates are accurate. 
However, some of the announcements are time-stamped after the closure of the stock market, which is why we also 
include day +1 in our analysis of convertible debt announcement returns.  
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since most prior event studies on security offerings also focus on issues made prior to 2000. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that convertible bond announcement stock returns are 
significantly more negative during the Arbitrage period than during the Traditional Investor 
period (-4.59% compared with -1.69%), while equity and straight debt announcement stock 
returns remain fairly stable. However, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that Post-Lehman-
period convertible bond announcement effects are significantly more negative than those in the 
previous two periods (-9.12%). Equity announcement stock returns are also slightly more 
negative over this period (-3.21%), but the magnitude of the change is much smaller than that for 
convertibles. Kruskal-Wallis p-values confirm that there are substantial differences in abnormal 
stock returns around convertible bond announcements across the three periods (the p-value for 
differences in convertible bond wealth effects across the three periods is smaller than 0.001), 
while there are no such differences for equity and bond announcement-period stock returns.  
Figure 2 visualizes the evolution in security offering announcement effects over our research 
period by plotting quarterly average shareholder wealth effects for each of the three security 
types. The observed patterns are similar to those discussed in the context of Table 3. While 
equity and straight debt offering announcement effects remain fairly constant (except for a 
decrease in equity offering announcement effects during the Post-Lehman period), convertible 
debt announcement-period stock returns exhibit a declining trend. Returns drop sharply as of the 
beginning of the Arbitrage period, and fall even further at the beginning of the Post-Lehman 
period.   
 
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
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4.2. Determinants of convertible debt announcement returns 
In the next step of the empirical analysis, we test whether the evolutions in convertible debt 
announcement returns documented in Table 3 and Figure 2 can be attributed to changes in the 
convertible bond investor base, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Table 4 reports the results of 
regression specifications with the CAR over the window (-1, 1) relative to the convertible bond 
announcement date as the dependent variable.  
 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 
Column (1) includes a dummy variable equal to one for convertibles issued during the 
Arbitrage period, and a dummy variable equal to one for convertibles issued during the Post-
Lehman period. Both variables have significantly negative regression coefficients. In line with 
the univariate test results, we find that the differences between the periods are large in economic 
terms. The abnormal return in the Arbitrage Period is 283 basis points lower than in the 
Traditional Investor period, and the abnormal return in the Post-Lehman period is 716 basis 
points lower than in the Traditional Investor period.  
In Column (2), we extend the regression with the control variables specified earlier. The 
inclusion of these variables results in a substantial increase in the adjusted R2, from 7.40% to 
10.35%. As expected, CARs are negatively influenced by long-term debt and issuer stock return 
volatility.13 CARs are significantly positively influenced by the market-to-book ratio, which is 
consistent with results reported by De Jong et al. (2011). In line with our predictions, we also 
find that abnormal returns are significantly negatively influenced by the 
                                                 
13
 Our finding on issuer stock return volatility is consistent with Liu and Switzer (2009), who find a negative impact 
of firm risk measures on stock price reactions to convertible debt announcements. 
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Issuance=Announcement dummy variable, term spreads, and market return volatility. The only 
finding that is inconsistent with our predictions is the significant positive impact of interest rates.  
Most importantly, the coefficients of the ArbPeriod and PostLehmanPeriod dummy 
variables remain significantly negative when controlling for issue, issuer, and macroeconomic 
characteristics. However, the magnitude of the coefficients for both periods drops to 
approximately 60% of their size in Column (1). Thus, part of the more negative announcement 
returns for convertibles issued during the Arbitrage and Post-Lehman periods seems to be caused 
by the fact that these offerings have higher values (compared with Traditional Investor-period 
offerings) on characteristics that negatively affect convertible bond announcement returns. For 
example, as documented in Table 2, the Post-Lehman period is characterized by high issuer 
volatility, a high percentage of offerings with overlapping issue and announcement dates, and 
high market volatility. All of these characteristics turn out to have a significant negative impact 
on convertible bond announcement returns in Column (2) of Table 4.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the differences in convertible bond announcement returns 
between the three periods should no longer be significant after controlling for differences in 
arbitrage-related short selling. In Column (3), we test this prediction by including the variable 
ArbDemand/SO, which captures the predicted hedging demand from convertible arbitrageurs. 
We interact this variable with each of the three period dummy variables. The interaction term of 
ArbDemand/SO with the ArbPeriod dummy variable has a strongly significant negative impact 
on convertible debt announcement returns, which corroborates the importance of arbitrage-
induced short selling during the Arbitrage period. The interaction terms of ArbDemand/SO with 
the two other period dummy variables also have a significant negative impact, but with much 
smaller coefficient sizes than for the ArbDemand/SO*ArbPeriod interaction term. This pattern is 
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consistent with the notion that convertible arbitrageurs are also active during the Traditional 
Investor and Post-Lehman periods, albeit to a lesser extent than during the Arbitrage period.14 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on the ArbPeriod dummy variable is no longer 
significantly negative after controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling. In fact, the dummy’s 
coefficient is now positive, albeit not statistically significant. We also find that the 
PostLehmanPeriod dummy variable is no longer significant after controlling for arbitrage-
induced short selling. Our results thus suggest that arbitrage-induced short selling during the 
Global Financial Crisis was still substantial enough to explain the announcement return 
differences between Traditional Investor- and Post-Lehman-period convertibles. Apparently, the 
convertible issues made during the Crisis attracted considerable interest from the remaining 
hedge funds in the market.15 Slack capital now has a significant negative impact, while it was 
previously not significant, and long-term debt, market-to-book, and the Issue=Announcement 
dummy are no longer significant. The findings with respect to the other control variables remain 
largely unaffected by the inclusion of the ArbDemand/SO interaction terms.  
The remaining regression specifications in Table 4 serve to test the robustness of the results 
in Column (3). Column (4) includes convertible debt underpricing as an additional control 
variable. Due to the limited availability of some of the input variables needed to calculate 
underpricing, we can only estimate this regression from 1991 onwards. As expected, we find a 
significant negative impact of underpricing on announcement returns. Thus, the extremely high 
underpricing levels of Post-Lehman convertible offerings may also contribute to their highly 
                                                 
14
 Calamos (2003) notes that convertible arbitrage has been used since the 19th century.  
15
 It is important to note that none of the Post-Lehman offerings in our sample were issued during the SEC’s short-
sale ban. This ban ranged from September 19, 2008 until October 9, 2008 and mainly affected financial stocks (see 
Grundy et al., 2012).  
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negative announcement returns.16 The other regression results are largely similar to those in 
Column (3).  
Column (5) includes interaction terms based on DeltaNeutral/SO as a measure of arbitrage-
induced short selling for a given convertible. Using DeltaNeutral instead of ArbDemand 
provides a more direct measure of the impact of the amount of shares sold short on convertible 
bond announcement returns. Consistent with the findings in Column (3), we find that the 
interaction term between DeltaNeutral/SO and the ArbPeriod dummy variable has a highly 
significant negative impact. Also similar to Column (3), the ArbPeriod dummy variable is not 
significant when controlling for this interaction term. The coefficient of the interaction term 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in the amount of shares sold short relative to shares 
outstanding leads to a 0.278 percentage points decrease in convertible bond announcement 
returns. However, in contrast with the findings in Column (3), the interaction term of 
DeltaNeutral/SO with the PostLehmanPeriod dummy does not have a significant coefficient, and 
the PostLehmanPeriod dummy variable coefficient remains significantly negative when 
controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling. One explanation for this divergence in the results 
is that DeltaNeutral does not take into account other issue and issuer characteristics significantly 
affecting hedging demand (i.e., illiquidity and the percentage of institutional ownership), and 
may as such be a less accurate measure for arbitrage interest in a given offering than 
ArbDemand.  
Columns (6) and (7) replicate Column (3) assuming that arbitrageurs follow, respectively, a 
bearish gamma and a bullish gamma hedging strategy instead of a delta-neutral hedging strategy. 
                                                 
16
 Inconsistent with this interpretation, the coefficient on the PostLehmanPeriod dummy variable in Column (4) (in 
which we control for underpricing) is not much different from that in Column (3) (in which we do not control for 
underpricing). However, it is important to note that the regression in Column (4) is only estimated for a subset of the 
data set (issues made from 1991 onwards), so that the coefficients are not directly comparable.  
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This analysis involves recalculating ArbDemand using the coefficients from Columns (3) and (4) 
of Panel B, Table 1, respectively. The findings are virtually similar to those in Column (3).  
Fabozzi et al. (2009) find that the strong increase in conversion premia as of the year 2000 
acts as a substantial driver of hedge fund returns. To examine whether changes in conversion 
premia over the three periods affect our findings, Column (8) includes interaction terms of the 
conversion premium with the ArbPeriod and PostLehmanPeriod dummy variables. We find that 
these interaction terms are not significant. Their inclusion leaves our other findings virtually 
unaltered. Overall, the findings in Table 4 provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.3. Stock returns following convertible bond offerings 
To examine Hypothesis 3, we calculate CARs over the extended windows (2, 5) and (2, 10) 
following convertible bond issue dates. The length of the windows is motivated by earlier studies 
showing that stock price reversals following arbitrage-related supply shocks tend to occur very 
fast (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Mitchell et al., 2004). Moreover, using longer windows would 
introduce too much noise in the abnormal return estimates (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). 
Table 5 reports the results of this analysis.  
 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
Panel A provides a univariate comparison of the stock returns following convertible 
offerings in the three periods. In line with our arbitrage explanation for the highly negative stock 
price effects observed for Arbitrage-period convertibles, we find significantly positive post-
issuance stock returns for offerings made during this period. The positive abnormal stock return 
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of 0.54% over window (2, 10) represents approximately 12% of the absolute value of the 
announcement-period CAR (0.54/4.59). Thus, in line with previous studies (Dhillon and 
Johnson, 1991; Mazzeo and Moore, 1992; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; De Jong et al., 2011), 
our evidence suggests that there is only a partial reversal of the negative impact of the supply 
shock. However, it is hard to isolate the true magnitude of the reversal of the price pressure 
effect due to the fact that the CAR (-1, 1) simultaneously captures the effect of the signalling 
content of the convertibles and the effect of price pressure resulting from arbitrage trading.  
By contrast, we find no evidence of a positive stock price reversal in the Traditional Investor 
and Post-Lehman periods. In fact, abnormal stock returns over the window (2, 10) are 
significantly negative during both periods. The finding of negative post-issuance returns is 
consistent with Lewis et al. (2001), who report long-run stock price underperformance following 
convertible debt issuance over longer investment horizons.  
In Panel B, we regress post-issuance stock returns on our measure for arbitrage-related 
increases in short interest. This regression analysis helps us verify whether the positive stock 
price reversal recorded for Arbitrage-period convertibles can effectively be attributed to the 
market absorption of arbitrage-induced short sales. If this is the case, then we should observe a 
larger stock price reversal for Arbitrage-period convertibles with higher hedging demand by 
convertible arbitrageurs, as captured by the ArbDemand/SO measure. Next to the interaction 
terms of the ArbDemand variable with the three period dummies, the regression also includes an 
Amihud illiquidity measure, since price reversals are expected to be stronger for more illiquid 
stocks (Bagwell, 1992).  
Consistent with the arbitrage explanation for post-issuance reversals in the Arbitrage-period 
announcement returns, we find a significant positive impact of the ArbDemand/SO*ArbPeriod 
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interaction term over both windows. By contrast, we find no significant impact of the 
corresponding interaction terms during the Traditional Investor and Post-Lehman periods. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we thus obtain stronger evidence of positive stock price reversals 
during years with higher involvement of convertible arbitrage funds. Our findings are robust to 
calculating ArbPeriod assuming a bearish gamma or bullish gamma instead of a delta-neutral 
hedging strategy.  
When stock prices increase, convertible bond deltas increase, resulting in larger required 
short positions (and vice versa for stock price decreases). To verify the potential impact of 
convertible arbitrageurs’ portfolio rebalancing actions on our results, Panel C of Table 5 presents 
average changes in convertible debt deltas and associated changes in required short positions (as 
captured by DeltaNeutral) over trading days one to ten following issuance. Column (1) reports 
the increase in delta relative to the previous trading day. At the start of day +1 following 
issuance, average deltas have slightly decreased relative to issue-date deltas due to issue-date 
stock price decreases. Overall, the daily changes in delta are very small. Since large delta 
increases for some firms could be masked by large delta decreases for other firms, Column (2) 
provides the average absolute changes in delta. We find that these changes are also minor.  
Columns (3) to (5) provide more insight into the required changes in shares shorted to 
preserve a delta-neutral hedging position, assuming daily rebalancing of the portfolio. Given the 
small changes in delta, it is not surprising that post-issuance changes in the number of shares to 
be shorted are marginal. The short positions need to be reduced by only 10,642 shares at the start 
of trading day +1 following issuance, corresponding with a mere 0.07% of the average 
DeltaNeutral position on the issue date. The required changes in shares shorted over subsequent 
trading days are even smaller. Column (4) shows that the average cumulative increase in 
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required short selling, as a percentage of the issue-date DeltaNeutral position, is only 0.16%. 
Column (5) indicates that considering absolute changes in required short selling leads to similar 
conclusions. Overall, Panel C shows that post-issuance changes in deltas and required delta-
neutral shorting positions are very small compared with the initial establishment of the short 
position on the issue date.17 Under typical rebalancing thresholds, such as the ones suggested by 
Fabozzi et al. (2009), (i.e., delta change tolerances between 0.02 and 0.3), we would observe 
even smaller changes in short positions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Over the past decades, the convertible bond market has experienced a substantial shift in its 
buyer base. In this paper, we show that this shift has important implications for the stockholder 
wealth effects registered around convertible bond announcements. In the Traditional Investor 
period, which ranges from 1984 to 1999 and is dominated by long-only investors, average 
convertible debt announcement effects are -1.69%. In the Arbitrage period, which ranges from 
2000 to September 2008 and is dominated by convertible arbitrage hedge funds, average 
convertible debt announcement effects drop to -4.59%. We hypothesize that this sharp decrease 
can be attributed to price pressure resulting from the hedging transactions of convertible 
arbitrageurs. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the differences between Traditional 
Investor- and Arbitrage-period announcement returns are no longer significant after controlling 
for arbitrage-induced short selling. This result is robust to assuming a range of arbitrage 
strategies and arbitrage-induced short selling measures.  
For convertibles issued after the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, we find even 
more negative average announcement effects of -9.12%. Our evidence indicates that these highly 
                                                 
17
 Our findings remain similar when considering only Arbitrage-period issues (untabulated).  
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negative stock price reactions can partly be explained by arbitrage-induced price pressure. 
Although the Global Financial Crisis sparked a decrease in hedge fund capital available for 
convertible debt investment, our findings suggest that the convertibles issued during the Crisis 
are still heavily taken up by the remaining convertible arbitrage funds. Moreover, Post-Lehman 
offerings have certain characteristics (e.g., high issuer and market volatility, and very high 
offering underpricing) that further depress convertible bond announcement returns.  
An interesting question is why firms have continued to issue convertible securities during 
periods dominated by convertible arbitrage funds as investors, given the negative impact of these 
arbitrageurs’ short-selling actions on issuer stock prices. Our analysis of post-issuance abnormal 
stock returns suggests that the prospect of incurring announcement-period price pressure may not 
be an important deterrent of convertible bond issuance, since part of the price pressure is 
reversed quickly after issuance. Moreover, as shown by Brown et al. (2010), hedge funds can act 
as relatively low-cost distributors of equity exposure for firms with high costs of raising 
seasoned equity. Firms may trade-off these lower issuance costs with the prospect of arbitrage-
induced price pressure when deciding between financing types.  
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Table 1: Determinants of changes in short interest around convertible bond issuance 
Panel A shows summary statistics for the potential determinants of arbitrage-related short selling associated with a convertible bond offering. Variables are 
defined as outlined in Appendix A and B. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in 
convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the 
predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. We use a Kruskal-Wallis test to jointly examine the differences in each issuer- and issue-specific characteristic between all three sub-
periods. In the last column, the letter “a” indicates a significant difference between the Traditional Investor period and the Arbitrage period, “b” indicates a 
significant difference between the Traditional Investor period and the Post-Lehman period, and “c” indicates a significant difference between the Arbitrage 
period and the Post-Lehman period. We use an independent sample t-test (assuming unequal variances) to examine the equality of means across any two sub-
periods for continuous variables, and a χ2-test to examine the equality of proportions across any two sub-periods for dummy variables (i.e., DividendPaying and 
ZeroCoupon). Panel B presents the results of an OLS regression analysis over the period 01/01/2003 to 14/09/2008. The dependent variable ∆SI/SO is the change 
in monthly short interest divided by shares outstanding over the month around the issue date. t-statistics, calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations.  
Panel A: Summary statistics for issuer- and issue-specific determinants of arbitrage-related short selling 
Variable Traditional Investor Period 
(N = 727) 
Arbitrage period  
(N = 645) 
Post-Lehman period  
(N = 64) 
Kruskal- 
Wallis p-
value 
Significance 
of 
difference 
in means 
 Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev. 
Amihud 0.260 0.029 1.395 0.013 0.002 0.040 0.159 0.024 0.703 0.000 a,b,c 
DividendPaying 37.451%   20.411%   25.609%    a 
InstitOwnership 0.414 0.406 0.229 0.715 0.752 0.217 0.754 0.808 0.231 0.000 a,b 
Volatility 0.443 0.405 0.173 0.551 0.491 0.247 1.063 0.994 0.593 0.000 a,b,c 
DeltaNeutral/SO 0.160 0.129 0.130 0.105 0.092 0.069 0.133 0.116 0.083 0.000 a,b,c 
GammaBear/SO 0.177 0.143 0.142 0.117 0.104 0.069 0.148 0.131 0.091 0.000 a,b,c 
GammaBull/SO 0.142 0.115 0.117 0.093 0.082 0.062 0.118 0.101 0.076 0.000 a,b,c 
Gamma 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.000 a,b,c 
ZeroCoupon 7.290%   7.878%   0.000%    b,c 
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Panel B: Regression analysis of ∆SI/SO on potential determinants of arbitrage-related short selling 
Variable Parameter estimate  
(t-value) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amihud -0.012** 
(-2.03) 
-0.020* 
(-1.89) 
-0.012** 
(-2.03) 
-0.020** 
(-2.04) 
DividendPaying 0.004 
(1.30) 
0.003 
(0.94) 
0.004 
(1.44) 
0.003 
(1.19) 
InstitOwnership 0.009* 
(1.66) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.009* 
(1.69) 
0.008 
(1.64) 
Volatility -0.007 
(-1.26) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.007 
(-1.30) 
-0.006 
(-1.23) 
DeltaNeutral/SO 0.143*** 
(8.54) 
0.138*** 
(7.50) 
  
GammaBear/SO   0.159*** 
(8.42) 
 
GammaBull/SO    0.131*** 
(8.63) 
Gamma 0.127 
(1.33) 
0.050 
(0.47) 
0.137 
(1.44) 
0.118 
(1.24) 
ZeroCoupon -0.000 
(-0.06) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.000 
(-0.07) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
CAFactiva -0.000 
(-1.39) 
 -0.000 
(-1.39) 
-0.000 
(-1.39) 
CAFlows  0.005 
(0.35) 
  
Intercept 0.003 
(0.36) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.003 
(0.38) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
     
Adj. R2 
R2 
N 
Period 
19.82% 
21.31% 
440 
2003-2008 
18.98% 
20.96% 
330 
2003-2008 
19.46% 
20.95% 
440 
2003-2008 
20.08% 
21.56% 
440 
2003-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            38 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for potential determinants of stock returns around convertible bond announcements 
This table provides descriptive statistics for issuer-specific, issue-specific, and macroeconomic variables across periods. Variables are defined as outlined in 
Appendix A and C. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge 
funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of 
convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We 
use a Kruskal-Wallis test to jointly examine the differences in each issuer- and issue-specific characteristic between all three sub-periods. In the last column, the 
letter “a” indicates a significant difference between the Traditional Investor period and the Arbitrage period, “b” indicates a significant difference between the 
Traditional Investor period and the Post-Lehman period, and “c” indicates a significant difference between the Arbitrage period and the Post-Lehman period. We 
use an independent sample t-test (assuming unequal variances) to examine the equality of means across any two sub-periods for continuous variables, and a χ2-
test to examine the equality of proportions across any two sub-periods for dummy variables (i.e., 144A and Issue=Announcement). N denotes the number of 
observations. 
Variable Traditional Investor Period 
(N = 727) 
Arbitrage period  
(N = 645) 
Post-Lehman period  
(N = 64) 
Kruskal- 
Wallis p-
value 
t-test for 
difference 
in means  Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev. 
Issuer-specific             
StockRunup 0.171 0.151 0.214 0.172 0.130 0.275 0.314 0.251 0.493 0.015 b,c 
Slack 0.142 0.067 0.173 0.229 0.142 0.236 0.151 0.092 0.188 0.000 a,c 
Tax 0.030 0.025 0.033 0.019 0.012 0.035 0.012 0.006 0.051 0.000 a,b 
LTDebt 0.214 0.201 0.167 0.214 0.207 0.183 0.283 0.284 0.194 0.000 b,c 
RelVolatility 3.744 3.128 2.435 3.246 3.039 1.419 4.480 4.968 2.515 0.000 a,c 
MarkettoBook 3.419 2.350 5.628 4.460 2.710 6.395 2.266 1.487 3.496 0.000 a,b,c 
FixedAssets 0.334 0.290 0.217 0.250 0.165 0.228 0.332 0.219 0.274 0.000 a,c 
LogAssets 5.433 5.319 1.514 4.460 2.710 6.395 6.398 6.987 1.716 0.000 a,b,c 
Issue-specific            
CreditRating 11.874 13.000 2.856 10.117 9.000 2.387 9.400 9.000 1.330 0.000 a,b,c 
Proceeds 0.400 0.289 0.424 0.359 0.224 0.462 0.129 0.078 0.132 0.000 b,c 
ConvPremium 22.185 22.000 7.478 32.721 30.010 13.903 22.709 25.000 8.330 0.000 a,c 
Maturity 16.704 15.240 7.444 14.877 20.095 8.942 6.945 5.033 5.426 0.000 a,b,c 
144A 9.491%   84.651%   34.375%    a,b,c 
Issue=Announcement 25.722%   88.372%   95.313%    a,b 
Underpricing 0.215 0.219 0.090 0.157 0.150 0.131 0.342 0.340 0.102 0.000 a,b,c 
Macroeconomic            
InterestRate 4.919 4.650 1.471 1.836 1.943 0.974 3.643 3.274 1.177 0.000 a,b,c 
TermSpread 2.023 1.900 0.963 1.653 1.853 1.300 2.906 2.827 0.374 0.000 a,b,c 
MarketRunup 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.019 0.024 0.070 0.041 0.055 0.136 0.000 a 
MarketVolatility 0.132 0.130 0.036 0.160 0.159 0.059 0.312 0.353 0.105 0.000 a,b,c 
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Table 3: Univariate analysis of stock returns around convertible debt, equity, and straight debt announcements 
This table shows average cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date for samples of 
convertible debt, equity, and straight debt offerings, as well as the standard deviation (std.dev) of these returns. CARs are calculated using standard event study 
methodology. CARsCD are the CARs of convertible debt issuers. CARsEQ are the CARs of seasoned equity issuers. CARsSD are the CARs of straight debt 
issuers. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The 
Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt 
issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We use a Patell Z-test 
to examine whether individual CARs are equal to zero. *, **, *** indicate significance of the Patell Z-test statistic at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We 
use a Kruskal-Wallis test to jointly examine differences between the CARs across all three sub-periods. N denotes the number of observations. 
Variable Traditional Investor Period 
 
Arbitrage period 
 
Post-Lehman period 
 
Kruskal- 
Wallis p-
value Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev 
CARsCD(-1, 1) -1.691%*** 5.074% -4.587%*** 7.200% -9.116%*** 9.405% 0.000 
N 727  645  64   
        
CARsEQ(-1, 1) -2.343%*** 6.125% -2.665%*** 7.676% -3.218%*** 11.668% 0.272 
N 3,579  1,143  163   
        
CARsSD(-1, 1) -0.094%* 3.668% -0.037% 3.993% -0.404%** 5.939% 0.061 
N 5,662  2,692  380   
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Table 4: Regression analysis of determinants of convertible debt announcement returns 
This table presents the results of a regression analysis of announcement-period cumulative abnormal stock returns of convertible offerings on a number of 
potential determinants. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, 
calculated using standard event study methodology. TradInvestorPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced in the 
Traditional Investor period, which ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999, and equal to zero otherwise. ArbPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible 
bond offerings announced in the Arbitrage period, which ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008, and equal to zero otherwise. PostLehmanPeriod is a dummy 
variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced during in the Post-Lehman period, which ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009, and equal to zero 
otherwise. ArbDemand/SO is the estimated arbitrage-related increase in short interest relative to shares outstanding, calculated for each convertible using the 
coefficients from the regression in Column (1) of Table 1 in all Columns except Columns (6) and (7). In Columns (6) and (7), ArbDemand/SO is calculated using 
the coefficients from the regressions in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1, respectively. All other explanatory variables are defined as outlined in Appendix A, B, 
and C. t-statistics, calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations.  
Variable Parameter estimate 
(t-value) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ArbPeriod -2.830*** 
(-8.30) 
-1.630** 
(-2.36) 
1.263 
(1.27) 
0.479 
(0.35) 
1.304 
(1.51) 
1.273 
(1.28) 
1.255 
(1.26) 
0.936 
(0.68) 
PostLehmanPeriod -7.160*** 
(-6.25) 
-4.273*** 
(-2.98) 
-2.852 
(-1.58) 
-3.045 
(-1.03) 
-4.408*** 
(-2.97) 
-2.928 
(-1.64) 
-2.793 
(-1.54) 
3.722 
(0.71) 
Issuer-specific          
StockRunup  -0.150 
(-0.16) 
-0.855 
(-0.85) 
-1.091 
(-0.83) 
-0.651 
(-0.67) 
-0.855 
(-0.85) 
-0.853 
(-0.85) 
-0.742 
(-0.76) 
Slack  -1.438 
(-1.22) 
-2.593** 
(-2.09) 
-2.747* 
(-1.75) 
-1.741 
(-1.46) 
-2.587** 
(-2.09) 
-2.597** 
(-2.10) 
-2.584** 
(-2.12) 
Tax  1.674 
(0.27) 
-0.673 
(-0.11) 
-1.954 
(-0.22) 
-0.810 
(-0.13) 
-0.606 
(-0.09) 
-0.725 
(-0.11) 
-0.072 
(-0.01) 
LTDebt  -2.084* 
(-1.84) 
-0.527 
(-0.43) 
-0.822 
(-0.51) 
-0.674 
(-0.58) 
-0.542 
(-0.44) 
-0.518 
(-0.42) 
-0.594 
(-0.48) 
RelVolatility  -0.314* 
(-1.94) 
-0.478*** 
(-2.74) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.253 
(-1.58) 
-0.477*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.478*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.468*** 
(-2.69) 
MarkettoBook  0.065* 
(1.81) 
0.011 
(0.35) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.011 
(0.35) 
0.011 
(0.36) 
0.011 
(0.35) 
0.011 
(0.34) 
FixedAssets  0.201 
(0.27) 
-0.219 
(-0.28) 
0.202 
(0.19) 
-0.303 
(-0.40) 
-0.208 
(-0.27) 
-0.227 
(-0.29) 
-0.220 
(-0.28) 
LogAssets  0.353 
(0.36) 
0.186 
(1.16) 
0.469** 
(2.04) 
0.035 
(0.22) 
0.187 
(1.17) 
0.187 
(1.16) 
0.216 
(1.38) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Variable Parameter estimate 
(t-value) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Issue-specific         
CreditRating  0.045 
(0.71) 
0.081 
(1.16) 
-0.051 
(-0.48) 
0.025 
(0.39) 
0.081 
(1.16) 
0.082 
(1.17) 
0.082 
(1.17) 
Proceeds  0.315 
(0.45) 
1.030 
(1.40) 
1.392 
(1.36) 
0.541 
(0.81) 
1.025 
(1.39) 
1.034 
(1.40) 
1.085 
(1.47) 
ConvPremium  -0.009 
(-0.57) 
-0.019 
(-1.25) 
-0.035* 
(-1.69) 
-0.021 
(-1.41) 
-0.019 
(-1.24) 
-0.019 
(-1.25) 
-0.019 
(-0.73) 
ConvPremium*ArbPeriod        0.010 
(0.33) 
ConvPremium*PostLehmanPeriod        -0.263 
(-1.46) 
Maturity  -0.002 
(-0.09) 
-0.027 
(-1.20) 
-0.054 
(-1.57) 
-0.007 
(-0.31) 
-0.026 
(-1.16) 
-0.028 
(-1.24) 
-0.030 
(-1.32) 
144A  0.194 
(0.35) 
0.284 
(0.48) 
0.816 
(1.18) 
0.063 
(0.11) 
0.284 
(0.48) 
0.283 
(0.48) 
0.386 
(0.66) 
Issue=Announcement  -0.828** 
(-1.96) 
-0.713 
(-1.60) 
-1.353* 
(-1.65) 
-0.718* 
(-1.69) 
-0.708 
(-1.59) 
-0.717 
(-1.61) 
-0.751* 
(-1.69) 
Underpricing    -5.836** 
(-2.38) 
    
Macroeconomic         
InterestRate  0.290** 
(2.15) 
0.308** 
(2.22) 
0.221 
(0.73) 
0.209 
(1.55) 
0.306** 
(2.20) 
0.310** 
(2.23) 
0.335** 
(2.42) 
TermSpread
 
  -0.362** 
(-2.52) 
-0.331** 
(-2.23) 
-0.213 
(-1.13) 
-0.256* 
(-1.77) 
-0.329** 
(-2.22) 
-0.332** 
(-2.23) 
-0.333** 
(-2.26) 
MarketRunup
 
  0.385 
(0.13) 
2.225 
(0.72) 
6.280 
(1.47) 
1.854 
(0.62) 
2.187 
(0.70) 
2.255 
(0.73) 
2.235 
(0.72) 
MarketVolatility  -11.113*** 
(-2.84) 
-13.267*** 
(-3.23) 
-10.723* 
(-1.80) 
-11.154*** 
(-2.81) 
-13.250*** 
(-3.22) 
-12.278*** 
(-3.23) 
-14.727*** 
(-3.51) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Variable Parameter estimate 
(t-value) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Arbitrage shorting          
ArbDemand/SO*TradInvestorPeriod   -27.691*** 
(-2.61) 
-53.438* 
(-1.77) 
 -27.751*** 
(-2.60) 
-27.613*** 
(-2.60) 
-27.187** 
(-2.55) 
ArbDemand/SO*ArbPeriod   -171.074*** 
(-5.03) 
-160.746*** 
(-5.03) 
 
-172.352*** 
(-5.10) 
-169.990*** 
(-4.98) 
-168.701*** 
(-4.94) 
ArbDemand/SO*PostLehmanPeriod   -82.158* 
(-1.69) 
-82.158* 
(-1.69) 
 -78.478* 
(-1.66) 
-84.980* 
(-1.71) 
-98.463** 
(-2.42) 
DeltaNeutral/SO*TradInvestorPeriod   
  
-2.316* 
(-1.75) 
   
DeltaNeutral/SO*ArbPeriod     -27.815*** 
(-5.89) 
   
DeltaNeutral/SO* PostLehmanPeriod     -0.430 
(-0.33) 
   
Intercept -1.689*** 
(-9.11) 
-1.738 
(-0.88) 
0.709 
(0.33) 
0.418 
(0.14) 
1.101 
(0.54) 
0.696 
(0.33) 
0.713 
(0.34) 
0.572 
(0.28) 
         
Adj. R2 
N 
Period 
7.40% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
10.35% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
13.12% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
9.78% 
788 
1991-2009 
13.41% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
13.80% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
13.12% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
10.81% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
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Table 5: Analysis of stock returns, delta, and required short selling following convertible debt issues 
This table analyses abnormal stock returns as well as changes in delta and in required arbitrage-related short selling (as captured by DeltaNeutral) in the days 
following convertible bond issuance. Trading days are measured relative to the convertible bond issue date. Panels A and B present cumulative abnormal stock 
returns (CARs) following convertible bond issues, calculated using standard event study methodology. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 
31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to 
the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 
31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Panel A present average CARs over the windows (2, 5) and (2, 10), as well as 
standard deviations (std.dev) of these CARs. We use a Patell Z-test to examine whether individual CARs are equal to zero. We use a Kruskal-Wallis test to 
jointly examine differences between the CARs across all three sub-periods. Panel B presents the results of a regression analysis of the CARs over the windows 
(2, 5) and (2, 10) on a number of potential determinants. TradInvestorPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced in the 
Traditional Investor period, and equal to zero otherwise. ArbPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced in the Arbitrage 
period, and equal to zero otherwise. PostLehmanPeriod is a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond offerings announced during in the Post-Lehman 
period, and equal to zero otherwise. ArbDemand/SO is the estimated arbitrage-related increase in short interest relative to shares outstanding, calculated for each 
convertible using the coefficients from the regression in Column (1) of Table 1. Amihud captures illiquidity of the issuer stock and is defined as outlined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics, estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are in parentheses. In Panels A and B, *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. Panel C presents changes in deltas and required short selling for 
achieving a delta-neutral position (DeltaNeutral) in the ten trading days following the convertible bond issue date. Delta and DeltaNeutral are calculated as 
outlined in Appendix B. Column (1) provides the average daily increase in delta with respect to its previous day value. Column (2) provides the average absolute 
change in delta with respect to its previous day value. Column (3) provides the average daily change in DeltaNeutral (as a result of the change in delta) with 
respect to its previous day value. Column (4) provides the average cumulative increase in DeltaNeutral since the issue date, as a percentage of the value of 
DeltaNeutral on the issue date. Column (5) provides the average cumulative absolute change in DeltaNeutral since the issue date, as a percentage of the value of 
DeltaNeutral on the issue date. 
Panel A: Univariate analysis of abnormal stock returns following convertible bond issuance 
Variable Traditional Investor period 
 
Arbitrage period 
 
Post-Lehman period 
 
Kruskal- 
Wallis p-
value Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev Average Std.Dev 
CARs(2, 5) -0.023% 5.257% 0.503%*** 6.112% −1.848% 11.516% 0.000 
CARs(2, 10) -0.459%** 8.253% 0.541%*** 8.793% −3.391%* 11.492% 0.000 
N 727  645  64   
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Panel B: Regression analysis of abnormal stock returns following convertible bond issuance 
Variable Parameter estimate  
(t-value) 
CARs(2, 5) (1) CARs(2, 10) (2) 
ArbDemand/SO*TradInvestorPeriod 0.766 
(0.07) 
-2.199 
(-0.13) 
ArbDemand/SO*ArbPeriod 41.310*** 
(2.32) 
50.975* 
(1.88) 
ArbDemand/SO*PostLehmanPeriod -33.241 
(-0.82) 
-41.913 
(-0.95) 
Amihud -0.050 
(-0.48) 
0.070 
(0.33) 
Intercept -0.243 
(-0.75) 
-0.515 
(-1.07) 
   
Adj. R2 
N 
Period 
0.76% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
0.49% 
1,436 
1984-2009 
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Panel C: Average daily changes in delta and DeltaNeutral following convertible bond issuance 
Trading day Delta  DeltaNeutral 
Average daily 
increase 
 
(1) 
Average absolute 
change 
 
(2) 
 Average daily increase 
 
 
(3) 
Average cumulative 
increase as % of day-0 
value 
(4) 
Average cumulative 
absolute change as % of 
day-0 value 
(5) 
1  -0.00050 0.00214  -10,642 -0.07% 0.29% 
2 -0.00016 0.00281  -1,371 -0.07% 0.57% 
3 0.00025 0.00224  -694 -0.03% 0.69% 
4 0.00032 0.00227  6,172 0.02% 0.79% 
5 -0.00004 0.00215  -3,963 0.02% 0.86% 
6 0.00020 0.00230  809 0.05% 0.95% 
7 0.00016 0.00224  5,303 0.07% 0.98% 
8 0.00021 0.00209  5,870 0.09% 1.00% 
9 0.00008 0.00235  -982 0.11% 1.08% 
10 0.00023 0.00230  2,438 0.16% 1.16% 
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Figure 1: Quarterly number of convertible arbitrage-related articles appearing in the Factiva database 
This figure shows the number of news sources (articles or press releases) containing any of the terms “convertible arbitrage”, “convertible debt arbitrage”, 
“convertible bond arbitrage”, “convertible arbitrageur”, “convertible debt arbitrageur”, “convertible bond arbitrageur”, “convertible arbitrageurs”, “convertible 
debt arbitrageurs”, or “convertible bond arbitrageurs” in Factiva in any given quarter over the period 1984 to 2009. To avoid double-counting, we exclude 
instances where the same article appears more than once. 
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Figure 2: Average quarterly stockholder wealth effects of convertible, equity, and straight debt announcements   
This figure shows average quarterly cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) for security offering announcements between January 1984 and December 2009. 
We calculate abnormal returns for each security announcement over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date using standard event study 
methodology, and then average across security offering announcements made in the same quarter. We take the moving average of four quarters to smooth the 
time series of announcement effects. CARsCD are the CARs of convertible debt issuers. CARsEQ are the CARs of seasoned equity issuers. CARsSD are the 
CARs of straight debt issuers. The Traditional Investor period ranges from 1/1/1984 to 31/12/1999 and refers to the period before the surge in convertible 
arbitrage hedge funds. The Arbitrage period ranges from 1/1/2000 to 14/9/2008 and refers to the period when convertible arbitrageurs were the predominant 
purchasers of convertible debt issues. The Post-Lehman period ranges from 15/9/2008 to 31/12/2009 and refers to the period following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. 
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Appendix A: Detailed definitions of issuer-specific, issue-specific, and macroeconomic variables included in the analysis 
 
This Appendix provides a definition of the explanatory variables used in the paper, listed in alphabetical order. Issue characteristics are obtained from SDC. 
Balance sheet and income statement variables are obtained from Compustat Fundamentals Annual and measured at the fiscal year end preceding the convertible 
bond announcement date, unless noted otherwise. # indicates a Compustat Fundamentals Annual data item. Stock price data are obtained from CRSP. Trading 
days are measured relative to the convertible bond announcement date. Macroeconomic characteristics are obtained from Datastream, unless noted otherwise.  
Variable name Classification Calculation 
144A Issue-specific Dummy variable that takes the value one for offerings made under SEC Rule 144A. 
Amihud Issuer-specific Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily stock returns divided by 
trading volumes averaged over the window (-120, -20). For expositional purposes, we multiply this ratio by 106.  
CAFactiva Macroeconomic Number of news sources in Factiva mentioning “convertible arbitrage” or a related search term (as outlined in 
Figure 1), calculated over the quarter preceding the convertible bond announcement date.  
CAFlows Macroeconomic Flows into convertible arbitrage hedge funds over the quarter prior to the convertible bond issuance quarter. We 
obtain data on flows into convertible bond arbitrage hedge funds from the TASS Live and Graveyard databases, 
which provide coverage from 1994 onwards. We select those funds that state convertible arbitrage as their 
primary investment category and that have a U.S.-oriented geographical focus (164 in total). We measure hedge 
fund flows in a similar way as Choi et al. (2010). First, we calculate dollar flows for each fund using the change 
in total net assets over the quarter, adjusted for the returns of the fund. We then aggregate flows and total net 
assets across funds for each quarter and divide the change in total flows by total lagged assets to obtain 
percentage quarterly fund flows. 
ConvPremium Issue-specific Conversion premium of the convertible, expressed as a percentage. It is calculated by dividing the conversion 
price by the stock price measured on trading day -5, and subtracting one from this ratio.  
CreditRating Issue-specific Moody’s credit rating of the convertible at the moment of issuance. Consistent with Chan and Chen (2007), we 
assign a value of one to Moody’s Aaa ratings and add a value of one to each subsequent rating. If the convertible 
has no Moody’s rating but is rated by Standard and Poor’s, we convert the S&P rating into the equivalent 
Moody’s rating. In line with Loncarski et al. (2009), we assign a rating of Baa2 to unrated convertibles.  
Delta Issue-specific Sensitivity of the convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value, measured as outlined in 
Appendix B.  
DeltaNeutral/SO  Issue-specific Number of shares that need to be shorted for arbitrageurs to obtain a delta-neutral position as of the issue date, 
calculated as outlined in Appendix B, divided by the number of shares outstanding measured on trading day -20.  
DividendPaying Issuer-specific Dummy variable equal to one if the convertible bond issuer paid out a dividend over the previous fiscal year, 
which can be established through Compustat #26. 
FixedAssets Issuer-specific Plant, property, and equipment (#8) divided by total assets (#6). 
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Gamma Issue-specific Sensitivity of the convertible bond delta to its underlying common stock value, measured as outlined in 
Appendix B.  
GammaBear/SO Issue-specific Number of shares that need to be shorted for arbitrageurs to obtain a bearish gamma hedge as of the issue date, 
calculated as outlined in Appendix B, divided by the number of shares outstanding measured on trading day -
20. 
GammaBull/SO Issue-specific Number of shares that need to be shorted for arbitrageurs to obtain a bullish gamma hedge as of the issue date, 
calculated as outlined in Appendix B, divided by the number of shares outstanding measured on trading day -
20. 
InstitOwnership Issuer-specific Number of shares held by 13F institutions (obtained from Thomson Reuters), divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (both measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the convertible bond announcement date).  
InterestRate Macroeconomic Difference between yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and the inflation rate (measured as the 
continuously-compounded annual change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index), averaged over the quarter prior to 
issuance. 
Issue=Announcement Issue-specific Dummy variable that takes the value one when the issue date and announcement date coincide, or when the 
issue date falls one trading day after the announcement date.  
LogAssets Issuer-specific Natural logarithm of total assets (#6), deflated by the Consumer Price Index (obtained from Datastream). 
LTDebt Issuer-specific Long-term debt (#9) divided by total assets (#6). 
MarketRunup Macroeconomic Return on the S&P 500 index over the quarter prior to issuance.  
MarkettoBook Issuer-specific Market value (calculated as #25 multiplied by #199) divided by the book value of common equity (#60). 
MarketVolatility
 
 Macroeconomic Annualized market return volatility, calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index over the quarter prior 
to issuance.  
Maturity 
Proceeds 
Issue-specific 
Issue-specific 
Convertible bond maturity, measured as of the issue date (obtained from SDC). 
Relative size of the convertible bond offering, calculated as the offering proceeds divided by total assets (#6). 
RelVolatility Issuer-specific Annualized stock return volatility, estimated from daily stock returns over the window (-240, -40) relative to 
the convertible bond announcement date, divided by the annualized standard deviation of the S&P 500 index 
(obtained from Datastream) calculated over the same period. 
Slack Issuer-specific Cash and short-term investments (#1) divided by total assets (#6). 
StockRunup Issuer-specific Stock return over the window (-60, -2) relative to the announcement date. 
Tax Issuer-specific Income taxes paid (#16) divided by total assets (#6). 
TermSpread
 
 Macroeconomic Difference between yields on ten-year U.S. Treasury Bonds and three-month Treasury Bills, averaged over the 
quarter prior to issuance.  
Underpricing Issue-specific Underpricing of the convertible bond as of its issue date, measured as outlined in Appendix C.  
Volatility Issuer-specific Annualized stock return volatility, estimated from daily stock returns over the window (-240, -40) relative to 
the convertible bond announcement date. 
ZeroCoupon Issue-specific Dummy variable equal to one for zero-coupon convertibles.  
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Appendix B: Calculation of DeltaNeutral, GammaBear, and GammaBull 
 
DeltaNeutral represents the number of shares expected to be shorted by arbitrageurs, 
under the assumption that arbitrageurs follow a delta-neutral hedging strategy. In line 
with De Jong et al. (2011), we calculate this variable as follows: 
 
priceconversion
deltavaluefaceissuedesconvertiblofnumber
alDeltaNeutr ××=  (1) 
We calculate the number of convertibles issued by dividing the offering proceeds by 
the face value of the convertible (both obtained from SDC). Delta represents the 
sensitivity of the convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value. In line 
with Burlacu (2000), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007), and Loncarski et al. (2009), we 
calculate Delta as follows: 
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   (2) 
with δ the continuously-compounded dividend yield (obtained from Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual by dividing #26 by #199), N(.) the cumulative probability under a 
standard normal distribution, S the stock price on trading day -5 relative to the 
announcement date (obtained from CRSP), X the conversion price (obtained from SDC), 
r the yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury Bond measured on the issue date (obtained from 
CRSP), σ the stock return Volatility, and T the convertible bond Maturity (both measured 
as outlined in Appendix A).18  
                                                 
18
 As argued in Zabolotnyuk et al. (2010), a potential disadvantage of delta is that it does not capture 
convertibility and callability characteristics. As such, delta provides an incomplete measure for the equity 
component size of convertibles. However, the purpose of the delta measure included in the DeltaNeutral 
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Arbitrageurs may also exploit the convertible’s gamma to obtain incremental profits. 
Gamma measures the sensitivity of the convertible’s delta to underlying stock price 
movements. In line with Fabozzi et al. (2009), we calculate gamma as: 
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with φ the probability distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and all 
other parameters defined as in the context of Equation (2). Consistent with Fabozzi et al. 
(2009), we consider a bearish gamma strategy in which arbitrageurs buy the convertible 
and short-sell Delta plus 0.09, and a bullish gamma strategy in which they buy the 
convertible and short sell delta minus 0.09. We calculate GammaBear and GammaBull 
values using Equation (1), but replacing delta with delta plus 0.09 and delta minus 0.09, 
respectively.  
 
Appendix C: Calculation of convertible debt underpricing at issuance 
In line with Chan and Chen (2007) and De Jong et al. (2011), we define initial 
Underpricing as the difference between the convertible bond’s theoretical price and the 
bond’s issue price, divided by the bond’s theoretical price. We obtain the issue price from 
SDC. To calculate the theoretical convertible bond price, we use the Tsiveriotis and 
                                                                                                                                                  
variable is to replicate the inputs that are actually used by arbitrageurs in their hedging strategy. Calamos 
(2003) argues that arbitrageurs base their hedging on a delta measure analogous to the one defined in 
Equation (2), so we conclude that it is appropriate to use this measure as an input in DeltaNeutral.  
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Fernandes (1998) model, which is widely used in other studies on convertible bond 
underpricing (Ammann et al., 2003; Chan and Chen, 2007; Loncarski et al., 2009; De 
Jong et al., 2011). As pointed out by Zabolotnyuk et al. (2010), the method is also 
popular among practitioners.  
Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) use a binomial-tree approach to model the stock 
price process and decompose the total value of a convertible bond into an equity 
component and a straight debt component. We use the following input variables in the 
model (all measured as of the convertible bond issue date, unless otherwise mentioned): 
yield on U.S. government bonds of which the maturity most closely matches the maturity 
of the convertible bond (obtained from CRSP); Moody’s credit ratings or equivalent 
Standard and Poor’s ratings converted to a Moody’s rating (obtained from SDC);19 credit 
spreads of similarly-rated corporate straight debt (obtained from Datastream);20 
conversion ratios and call schedules; dividend yield for the fiscal year preceding the 
announcement date (obtained from Compustat Fundamentals Annual by dividing #26 by 
#199), price of the underlying stock averaged between trading days -12 and -2 prior to the 
announcement date; and Volatility calculated as outlined in Appendix A.  
 
                                                 
19
 We assign a rating of Baa2 to unrated convertibles, as in Loncarski et al. (2009). 
20
 Since Datastream discontinues the provision of credit spreads as of the end of 2008, we construct our 
own credit spread estimates for convertibles issued in 2009. In 2009, 95% of our sample offerings are 
unrated (and thus classified as Baa2-rated offerings), while the remainder of the offerings are speculative 
grade. To calculate Baa2 credit spreads, we subtract the 20-year Treasury Bond rate (obtained from CRSP) 
from the yield on Baa-rated bonds (obtained from Bloomberg). To measure the credit spread for the (very 
few) speculative grade issues, we download the Barclays yield series on high-yield U.S. corporate bonds 
from Datastream and subtract the 20-year Treasury Bond rate from this yield. We also used other 
benchmark maturities (7-, 10-, and 30-year Treasury Bond yields), but found that 20-year yields result in 
spreads with the highest correlation and the smallest difference with the credit spreads reported by 
Moody’s.  
 
